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INTRODUCTION
Introduction: democracy, diversity
Enrico Biale, Anna Elisabetta Galeotti   and Federica Liveriero 
department of humanities, University of Piemonte orientale, vercelli, italy
The collection of essays published in this special issue represents the final out-
come of a research project – URBANITAS which we carried out, respectively as 
principal investigator and as researchers between 2013 and 2015.1 The project 
was focused on the social and cultural diversity characterizing contemporary 
democracy and on the political response to the tensions and conflicts produced 
by the encounter of so many differences in the same political space.
The issue of cultural diversity has been at the center of the debate over mul-
ticulturalism for few decades now, and more recently on the discussion over 
interculturalism (Cantle, 2012; Guidikova, 2014; Lægaard, 2015; Meer, Modood, 
& Zapata-Barrero, 2016; Meer, Mouritsen, Faas, & de Witte, 2015; Modood, 2014). 
On the one hand, social diversity represents an opportunity, widening the hori-
zon of social options, and perspectives of innovation, but, on the other, it creates 
problems for social cohesion and peaceful coexistence of many groups, be it 
majority or minority. In this special issue, social diversity, with its potential con-
flicts and disagreements, is considered mainly from the viewpoint of democracy, 
concerning both the responses of democratic institutions to citizens’ claims 
related to diversity issues, and the effects of pluralism on democratic process 
and deliberation.
This two-fold reflection on democracy and diversity calls for a preliminary 
inquiry into the nature of the conflicts arising from cultural and social differ-
ences before any sensible political response be considered. First, it is relevant 
to distinguish between conflicts that arise from doctrinal disagreements and/
or different conceptions of the good, and conflicts that are due to the clash of 
different social standards and mechanisms of social cooperation in daily inter-
actions among majority and minority members (Galeotti). Second, it is theoret-
ical compelling to assess what impact the fact of political pluralism has on the 
general theory of democracy, and specifically on deliberative accounts (Martì, 
Biale and Liveriero, Ottonelli). Third, it is central to assess whether the traditional 
consensus-oriented model of deliberation is still adequate for dealing with such 
diverse and multicultural political societies (Rostbøll, Weinstock).
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Concerning the analysis of conflicting social interactions between members 
of majority and minority groups, we will defend a deflationary approach with 
regard to cultural conflicts that are too often described as unsolvable, and will 
explore the role of the virtue of civility in improving respect-based interactions 
among agents and when civility has to give way to toleration, in case social 
standards are not shared and known (Galeotti). Relating to the philosophical 
debate about the legitimacy of normative models of democracy (Christiano, 
2004; Dahl, 1989; Manin, 1987), we will defend a deliberative perspective because 
such paradigm does not reduce political agency to the mere expression of pref-
erences, but acknowledges citizens as reflexive political agents who need to 
develop, challenge, and critically assess their claims (Martì, Biale and Liveriero). 
Furthermore, we will evaluate whether certain strategies of deliberative inclusion 
must be set aside, as they might end up disrespecting people as agents who have 
practical authority over their own lives (Ottonelli). As for the possibility of having 
principled forms of compromise substituting consensus-oriented conceptions 
of deliberative democracy (Gutmann & Thompson, 2012; Habermas, 1996), our 
analysis will show that this strategy can properly be justified appealing to two 
normative arguments that, again, highlight the reflexive agential capacities of cit-
izens. First, compromise can be justified showing that the concept of democratic 
respect requires us to treat fellow citizens as co-rulers (Rostbøll). Second, delib-
eration that aims at compromise can be defended as most adequate, showing 
that it grants a full acknowledgment of the normative requirement of reciprocal 
concession at the heart of the exchange of reasons that characterizes democratic 
decision-making processes (Weinstock).
The six essays of this special issues deal with different, though related, topics 
concerning the tense relationship between democracy and diversity. All the 
contributions share the theoretical insight that diversity is one of the raison 
d’être of democracy and, still, all acknowledge that the fact of pluralism poses 
challenges to the legitimacy of democratic procedures of decision-making. If 
citizens had the same values and preferences, collective decisions would be eas-
ily achieved and the institution of democratic procedures would be redundant. 
Yet, the wide pluralism of doctrines, habits, social standards, conception of the 
goods, and typical of contemporary societies, has often led citizens to challenge 
the legitimacy of democratic decisions because these choices do not fit their 
preferences or values. To address these challenges, following recent accounts 
of democratic decision-making (Bächtiger, Niemeyer, Neblo, Steenbergen, & 
Steiner, 2010; Dryzek, 2010; Mansbridge et al., 2010), in this volume different 
strategies will be introduced, defended, criticized, in order to outline a perspec-
tive that is able to guide actual decision-making processes (guidance), define 
standards that everyone has equal opportunity to fulfill (inclusion), and grant 
that citizens exercise their reflexive control on the whole democratic system 
(reflexivity).
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The philosophical arguments and analyses presented in the essays of this 
volume aim at depicting a democratic ideal that can ensure legitimate out-
comes in a context of deep pluralism by acknowledging members of the polity as 
reflexive agents, rather than mere beneficiaries of policies imposed from the top 
by institutions. The guiding question of this volume concerns whether democ-
racy in general, and deliberative models more specifically, once readjusted to 
deal with the challenges posed by diversity, can be defined as decision-making 
procedures that respect the agency of every citizen and grants them the oppor-
tunity to influence public choices. A normatively legitimated system of decision- 
making should respect pluralism, allowing citizens to express their differences 
and disagreement properly, and still must be able to provide acceptable political 
solutions. The articles in this volume will depart from the intrinsic connection 
between democracy and diversity – and the unavoidable challenges that plu-
ralism poses to decision-making procedures – investigating, from different per-
spectives, how the normative requirement of fully respecting agents’ reflexive 
agency impacts the revision of democratic decision-making procedures and the 
way in which institutions react to citizens’ justice-based claims.
Most of essays presented in the volume concede that looking at delibera-
tion as necessarily focused on consensus, in contexts of deep pluralism, may 
be problematic both for theoretical and practical reasons. On the one hand, an 
overly-idealized approach to decision-making process may lose track of actual 
decision-making processes, provoking a lack of guidance in political decisions. 
On the other hand, seeking consensus, through the establishment of deliber-
ative standards that some individuals or groups have less opportunities than 
others to fulfill, may engender exclusion and disrespectful treatment of certain 
groups. However, the authors reasonably disagree in suggesting strategies for 
revision such model for political decisions. For Martì consensus is still the ideal 
option, though compromise should be considered fully legitimate in our imper-
fect world; for others (Biale and Liveriero, Rostboll, Weinstock) compromise is the 
ideal outcome of a process that aims at fully respecting citizens and their values.
Along different lines, the special issue addresses thorny aspects of the ideal of 
inclusiveness. In fact, it is important to cast a light on the fact that certain strate-
gies that seem to be guided by the ideals of implementability and inclusiveness, 
might end up in frustrating the reflexive agency of members of society. Galeotti 
argues that the tendency to describe cultural conflicts as the outcome of strong 
incompatibility between different ideals and values (especially incompatibil-
ity among western and non-western values), far from portraying a respectful 
full-fledged narrative of agents’ most relevant principles and desires, ends 
up inflating the conflicts with an intolerant overtone and, mostly important, 
introducing value-laden obstacles to groups’ integration in a diverse society. 
Ottonelli, instead, criticizes the inclusion of the practice of personal storytelling 
among the new forms of deliberative interactions, showing that these non- 
reflexive forms of public interaction are unfairly burdensome for minorities and 
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marginalized individuals. We will now give more detailed summaries of the six 
articles included in this volume.
Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, in the first article, invites to look at cultural con-
flicts from a perspective different from the prevalent political rhetoric which 
emphasizes the incompatibility of many alien practices with the core values of 
liberal democracy. Instead of starting from the most controversial questions, 
and from the point of view of doctrinal disagreement, the essay proposes to 
consider the frictions in daily interactions between the society’s majority and 
minority groups. This move is based on the claim that most cultural conflicts 
do not concern irreducible disagreement about worldviews and principles but 
more mundane conflict over social standards. This strategy, Galeotti claims, 
allows to uncover a much-neglected dimension of diversity conflicts, namely 
that at stake there are social conventions and norms governing daily interactions 
more than incompatible principles. If doctrinal disagreement is set aside, the 
merging of social norms and the redesigning of social cooperation are com-
plicated and insidious in their own way. Galeotti’s essay shows that promoting 
an understanding of the nature and functioning of social standards for social 
cooperation is both normatively necessary and practically relevant (for local 
strategies), as this conceptual analysis helps in highlighting the often-dismissed 
agential status of members of minority groups that are usually treated as mere 
patients of social transformation.
Jose Luis Martì analyses political diversity with the attempt to clarify which 
are the relevant forms of political disagreements for deliberative democracy. 
According to his model, the fact of political pluralism, understood as the exist-
ence of a diversity of moral and political views and perspectives, rather than 
being a problem for the ideal of deliberative democracy, is one of the main 
contributing factors to its quality and legitimacy. This fact of pluralism not only 
makes deliberation possible and plausible, but it also contributes, under the 
right conditions, to the epistemic value of democracy. Furthermore, respect 
for political pluralism seems to derive conceptually from the basic democratic 
values of freedom and political equality. However, Martì notices, deliberative 
democracy also aims ideally at generating sufficient consensus, maybe even 
unanimity, provided that it is for the right reasons. Martì addresses the chal-
lenges that pluralists developed against this consensus oriented structure of 
the deliberative paradigm. According to their view our actual decision-making 
procedures should be designed to accommodate pluralism, and any attempt to 
reduce or eliminate it would undermine the very grounds of legitimacy in our 
liberal deliberative democracies. Once showed that the main dispute between 
consensualists and pluralists is about the role of disagreement in actual delib-
erative processes, Martì provides a clear analysis on the different kinds of dis-
agreement (pre/post deliberative, inherently political/s order disagreements) 
that can occur in a deliberative process. The second part of the essay explores 
the main differences between consensualist and pluralists regarding the role 
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of disagreement in actual deliberative procedures and shows that their dispute 
circumscribed to adjudicative reason-based consensus as opposed to the corre-
sponding reason-based disagreement. Since this small niche lacks practicality 
Martì claims that it only affects the kind of personal ideal commitment or aspi-
ration that virtuous deliberators should have when entering into a deliberative 
process, and has no concrete consequent institutional implications.
Enrico Biale and Federica Liveriero’s inquiry is prompted by similar insights. 
Their essay addresses the possibility of conferring legitimacy to democratic 
decision-making procedures in a context of deep pluralism. They defend a mul-
tidimensional account of democratic legitimacy according to which a legitimate 
system needs to grant, on the one hand, that citizens should be included on an 
equal footing and acknowledged as reflexive political agents rather than mere 
beneficiaries of policies, and, on the other hand, that their decisions have an 
epistemic quality. They criticize Estlund’s account of imperfect epistemic pro-
ceduralism showing that such model cannot fully recognize citizens as reflexive 
political agents and is grounded in an idealized model of the circumstances 
of deliberation. Biale and Liveriero then introduce an account of democratic 
legitimacy according to which political disagreement can be described not only 
as a factual circumstance of democratic decision-making systems, but the per-
fect expression of democratic ideals because only when citizens disagree and 
express their dissent can they properly exercise political agency. Furthermore, 
they claim that an account of democratic legitimacy that depends upon ideal-
ized circumstances cannot guide actual democratic procedures efficaciously, 
because it sets standards and goals that actual democratic systems cannot rea-
sonably aim to achieve. Consequently, they introduce an analysis of what they 
call ‘the actual epistemic circumstances of deliberation’ and then argue that 
the epistemic value of deliberation should be derived from the reasons-giving 
process established among epistemic peers, rather than from the reference to 
the alleged quality of deliberative outcomes and/or to the major expertise or 
ability of specific agents involved in the deliberative process (i.e. experts). Biale 
and Liveriero then claim that robustness can be adopted as an adequate crite-
rion for establishing when deliberative systems can be vindicated as epistem-
ically successful, because such criterion does not refer to an external standard 
of rightness and it also reflects the procedural insight of ensuring to everybody 
the possibility of impacting public choices.
Valeria Ottonelli’s essay testes the validity of the deliberative paradigm 
against the request to citizens’ exchange of information and experiences about 
themselves in a context of deep political diversity. Ottonelli wonders whether, 
in pluralistic contexts, where people are coming from different cultural and 
social backgrounds, the practice of personal storytelling is adequate for making 
agents’ internal point of view accessible to others within deliberative settings. 
Ottonelli confronts advocates of the idea that sharing personal experiences and 
narratives in the first person is a preferential means to bridge the informational 
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and motivational gap among members of different social groups. According to 
the author, whatever the epistemic merits of personal storytelling in democratic 
deliberation may be, the request for transparency and disclosure of people’s 
private experiences that this practice entails is objectionable on moral grounds 
because it disrespects people as agents who have practical authority over their 
own lives. The disclosure of people’s personal stories in public may humiliate 
them, reify them and abridge their personal liberties. What is worse, these harms 
are especially likely to be inflicted upon members of marginalized or disadvan-
taged minorities. They may be pressured to disclose personal, intimate or other-
wise confidential information; they are often subject to asymmetrical requests 
of disclosure, whereas the mainstream culture is not questioned; finally, the very 
presumption that their personal experience and internal point of view can be 
accessible and become fully transparent can be disrespectful to fundamental 
dimensions of their agency. After illustrating these claims through some rele-
vant examples, Ottonelli argues that a different route to the overcoming the 
informational gap that emerges in pluralistic contexts can be taken by resorting 
to the language of fundamental rights. This requires that the parties recognize 
each other as hermeneutical authorities on the meaning of fundamental rights 
as applied to their specific circumstances.
Christian Rostbøll tries to show that compromise has non-instrumental value 
and that the reasons for compromise are inherent in the democratic ideal, mak-
ing compromise a democratic imperative and not merely a regrettable necessity. 
In this essay Rostbøll, in contrast with other authors that have discussed whether 
there are principled reasons for compromise, defends the thesis that we need 
a specifically democratic conception of respect and that the latter can supply 
an intrinsic reason for compromise. If our concern is what is required by dem-
ocratic respect, we cannot rely on a general idea of what it means to respect 
others; we need to specify what it means to respect one’s opponents as fellow 
citizens. The essay argues that democratic respect goes beyond both the norm 
of treating one’s fellow citizens as equals and of respecting them as members 
of the same community. It is a conception of respect, which requires that we 
treat fellow citizens as co-rulers. Only the latter conception of respect is both 
sufficient to explain the moral importance of democratic procedures, includ-
ing compromise, and an inherently democratic ideal. The conclusion drawn by 
Rostbøll is that respect for citizens as co-legislators supplies a democratic reason 
for compromise. Compromise can be more democratic than a majority decision, 
because it shows respect for citizens as participants in collective self-legislation 
by representing their views in policy in a way that goes beyond what happens 
in uncompromising majority decisions.
Daniel Weinstock, along similar lines, discusses the normative role that com-
promise can play in deliberative systems characterized by deep cultural diver-
sity. The essay explores the relationship between deliberation on the one hand, 
and compromise and consensus on the other. The principal question concerns 
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whether it makes a difference to the nature of deliberation if compromise or con-
sensus is sought. According to what Weinstock refers to as the ‘no difference’ view, 
the question whether participants arrive at compromise or consensus depends 
not on the manner in which they have chosen to deliberate (for example, on the 
nature of the constraints that they have imposed upon their deliberations), but 
on the nature of the case at hand, and of the participants’ ex ante positions with 
respect to it. The nature of deliberation remains the same, regardless of its end 
result. The most prominent version on the ‘no difference’ view is that consensus is 
preferable to compromise, and that to the extent that it is appropriate to impose 
constraints upon deliberation, they should be those that make consensus more 
likely. Weinstock challenges this view trying to show that deliberation aimed at 
consensus is inappropriate, and potentially counter-productive, in the context of 
pluralist liberal democracies. Deliberation aimed at compromise, rather than con-
sensus, should therefore be promoted and practiced in pluralist liberal democ-
racies. It requires deliberative procedures distinct from those that characterize 
deliberation aimed at consensus, in that it requires of parties to a disagreement 
that they be transparent about their comprehensive conceptions of the good, 
in order to be able to measure the mutual concession that parties make to one 
another in deliberation.
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